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Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third 
World Military Expenditures* 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Recent research on the determinants of Third World military expenditures has indicated that economic 
variables show great promise in providing a framework as to the underlying causes of Third World defense 
allocation decisions. Building on this research, we test the hypotheses that the level of military 
expenditures in developing countries is determined in large part by economic constraints relative to 
external (threat) factors. In general this hypothesis is borne out with the important qualification that 
countries without an arms industry appear relatively more affected by external factors than countries with 
an arms industry. The main implication of the analysis is that a reduction in Third World arms production 
would most likely result in lower overall levels of military expenditures in these countries. 
1. Introduction 
Currently the world is spending vast amounts 
of resources, both physical and human, on 
defense. Although in total the bulk of 
defense expenditures are accounted for by 
the industrialized countries, over the last 
twenty years military expenditures have 
grown more rapidly in the Third World than 
in the NATO or Warsaw Pact countries. The 
net effect of these trends is increased military 
burdens on a per capita basis or as the share 
of defense in total national income. The 
Third World is also the major market for 
weapons exported by the industrialized 
countries. For many developing countries, 
the surge in arms imports in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s has left a legacy of growth 
impairing external indebtedness (Looney, 
1987a; Shubik & Bracken, 1983; Brzoska, 
1983). 
In 1973, the non-oil developing countries 
spent $28,518 million (in constant 1980 prices 
and exchange rates) on defense, while the 
OPEC countries allocated $15,707 million to 
military activities. By 1982, these figures had 
risen to $50,810 million and $52,903 million 
respectively. The Third World as a whole 
* I would like to thank an anonymous referee for the 
JPR and especially the Journal's editor, Nils Petter Gle-
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the Naval Postgraduate School or the United States 
Government. 
had doubled its total defense spending within 
ten years, a rate of growth far in excess of the 
major Western and Eastern alliances 
(SIPRI, 1986). 
While these rates of growth have slowed 
down in recent years- the non-oil developing 
countries spent $60,174 million and the 
OPEC countries $54,624 million in 1985, 
there is still great concern over the tendency 
of developing nations to devote significant 
proportions of their national resources to 
non-developmental activities. 
Because of the seriousness of these trends, 
there has been a rather dramatic increase in 
recent years of studies addressing either the 
causes or the consequences of Third World 
militarization. Here, analysis has been lar-






studies of whether military spending 
helps or hinders economic growth; 
analysis of budgetary trade-offs between 
defense and socio-economic allocations; 
determination of the main factors that 
contribute to successful development of 
indigenous arms industries; 
identification of factors affecting the 
levels of arms transfers to the developing 
countries; and 
examination of the major determinants 
of the level of defense spending. 
In large part, the bulk of the literature in 
this area stresses strategic-political variables 
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as critical in affecting arms imports, and total 
military expeditures (external threats, 
alliances, regional arms races), budgetary 
priorities (military vs. civilian regimes), indi-
genous arms production (independence of 
major suppliers, emulation of neighbors, 
fear of arms boycotts by major suppliers). 
Economic analysis has played only a tangen-
tial role in analysis of the determinants of 
these variables (Alexander, Butz & Mihalka, 
1981). Instead, most of the economically 
oriented approaches have been focused on 
the impacts of military expenditures, and, in 
particular, the effect of defense allocations 
on economic growth. A major conclusion of 
this work is that many Third World countries 
are likely to have sustained reductions in 
their growth as a result of increases in their 
military burdens (Chan, 1985, 1987). 
Surprisingly little analysis has yet been 
attempted to answer the question as to why, 
if in fact military expenditures (and presuma-
bly arms imports and domestic arms produc-
tion) retard growth, developing countries 
increase such allocations and activities even 
during periods of time when the resulting 
domestic strains may undermine political 
and social stability. 
The present paper attempts to fill this gap 
in the literature by examining the extent to 
which economic conditions delineate a range 
in which the level of Third World military 
expenditures are likely to fall. In particular, 
we are interested in the role indigenous arms 
production plays in influencing the budge-
tary process and hence the overall level 
of defense expenditures in developing 
countries. 
In contrast to the arms race literature, 
several recent studies (Harris, 1986; Maizels 
& Nissanke, 1986; Looney, 1986a, 1986c; 
Looney & Frederiksen, 1986a, 1988) have 
indicated that economic variables show great 
promise in providing a more accurate picture 
as to the underlying causes of Third World 
defense allocation decisions. 
Building on this research, we hypothesize 
that economic variables play a major if not 
predominant role in setting ranges in which 
Third World military expenditures are likely 
to lie. This hypothesis is tested using cross 
section data for the period of the early 1980s. 
2. Assessment of Non-Economic 
Approaches 
In discussing the role which economic factors 
can play in affecting our understanding of the 
growth in Third World armaments, it is use-
ful to begin by surveying several of the expla-
nations stressing non-economic factors. 
Here, a fundamental distinction can be made 
between exogenous and endogenous models 
of military expenditures. The exogenous 
category includes those approaches which 
see national military expenditure patterns as 
essentially responses to external stimuli, in 
particular the actions of rival nations (but 
possibly also those of alliance partners). The 
endogenous category includes those 
approaches which see military expenditure 
patterns resulting largely from changing 
domestic considerations (Treddenick, 1985, 
p. 78). 
With regard to exogenous theories, the 
popular and intuitively appealing metaphor 
of the 'arms race' has received the greatest 
attention in the literature. Nearly all arms 
race models trace their origin to the pioneer-
ing work of Lewis Richardson (1960). The 
well-known reaction equations developed by 
Richardson describe competitive armament 
acquisition in terms of the simultaneous 
linear differential equations, each equation 
depicting the rate of change of one nation's 
level of armaments as a positive function of 
the level of the rival nation's armaments and 
a negative function of its own. 
While the Richardson and alliance models 
may provide useful descriptive devices, they 
strain credulity unreasonably to attribute 
, their behavioral functions to the optimizing 
behavior of advanced industrial states, not 
alone Third World governments, most of 
which are neither seriously threatened by 
their neighbors, nor belong to formal mili-
tary alliances. In any case it is expecting too 
much for the State to have the information 
and processing capacity to pursue grand opti-
mizing strategies (Treddenick, 1985, p. 79). 
Interestingly enough, despite the concep-
tual problems outlined above, almost all of 
the quantitative analyses of the impact of 
military expenditure on Third World econ-
omic growth have, with the notable excep-
tions of Deger & Smith (1983) and Deger 
(1981), taken such expenditures as exogen-
ously given. 
3. Review of the Economic Impact Literature 
One of the earliest attempts to quantify the 
relationship between military spending and 
economic growth was completed by Emile 
Benoit (1978). While Benoit tentatively 
found that defense spending and economic 
performance were positively correlated, no 
clear agreement has yet emerged, with some 
authors suggesting a positive role for defense 
budgets under certain conditions (Frederik-
sen & Looney, 1982, 1983, 1985), and others 
suggesting an overall negative effect (Ball, 
1983). 
Chan contends (1985, p. 434) that one of 
the main problems to date is the little effort 
devoted to identifying the direction of 
causality, i.e. does defense lead to growth or 
does economic growth allow nations to 
'indulge in' more military programs - or 
both. However, this topic has also begun to 
receive some attention in the literature 
(Joerding, 1986; Frederiksen & LaCivita, 
1987). 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, 
little integration has taken place between the 
body of analysis focused on the defense/ 
growth issue, and that dealing with defense/ 
non-defense budgetary trade-offs. In part, 
one reason for the limited amount of 
research devoted to these issues probably 
stems from the fact that analysts examining 
large samples of developing countries are 
unlikely to find any particularly interesting 
linkages between defense and growth or be-
tween defense and non-defense budgetary 
categories (Vener, 1983). 
Recently, however, Looney (1988b) found 
significant differences between arms and 
non-arms2 producers in the manner that 
defense expenditures interacted with socio-
economic allocations with non-producers 
tending to cut a disproportionate number of 
growth-enhancing allocations to accommo-
date expansions in the military budget. The 
net impact was one of increased military 
spending impacting negatively on growth. 
In contrast, the arms producers as a group 
tended to avoid sharp cuts in growth-enhanc-
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ing expenditures (with the exception of 
agriculture). Looney concluded that along 
Keynesian lines the multiplier linkages be-
tween increases in the defense burden and 
the private sector in arms-producing coun-
tries, might in the aggregate be sufficient to 
produce an increase in aggregate growth. 
Apparently, the mere possession of a 
domestic arms industry places constraints on 
the budgetary process in arms-producing 
countries in a manner that is not present in 
non-arms-producing countries. The net 
effect is to skew allocations toward economic 
rather than social activities. 
Drawing together several of these themes, 
an interesting pattern emerges: 
(1) In general, resource unconstrained 
countries - defined largely in terms of 
exchange availability - appear to be cap-
able of generating positive rates of econ-
omic growth with increased military 
expenditures. Conversely, increased 
allocations to defense in countries exper-
iencing relative resource shortages tend 
to result in reduced rates of economic 
growth (Frederiksen & Looney, 1982, 
1983, 1985). 
(2) In addition, external debt accumulation 
also tended to increase growth in the 
unconstrained countries, but not in the 
constrained countries (Looney & Fre-
deriksen, 1986b). 
(3) Empirically, the most important factor 
differentiating Third World arms pro-
ducers from non-producers is the relati-
vely high degree of foreign exchange 
possessed by the producing countries. In 
essence, the producer countries are lar-
gely unconstrained and the non-pro-
ducer countries are constrained (Looney 
& Frederiksen, 1987b, 1986c). 
Based on their respective budgetary pat-
terns and overall resource abundance, we 
..,ould expect to find positive impacts on 
growth of increased military expenditures in 
the producer countries and negative impacts 
on growth in the non-producer countries. 
To test this hypothesis a model along the 
lines of Looney & Frederiksen ( 1986b) was 
developed. Here the growth in real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDPGB) over the 1970-
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82 period in the arms and non-arms-produc-
ing countries was assumed to be a function of 
the rate of growth in investment (GDIGB) 
from 1970-82; the average inflow of foreign 
resources as a percent of GNP (RBB) over 
the 1970-82 period; and the average military 
burden (military expenditures per capita, 
MEP) over the 1970-82 period. In addition, 
the rate of inflation (INFB) over the 1970-82 
period was included to control for any 
influence price movements may have had on 
the overall expansion of the economy. 3 
The results: 
Non-arms producers: 
GDPGB = 0.94 GDIGB - 0.18 INFB 
(7.13) (-1.90) 
- 0.57 MEP - 0.07 RBB 
(-4.47) (-0.64) 
.r2 = 0.628; F = 17.33; d.f. = 45 
Arms producers: 
GDPGB = 0. 72 GDIGB - 0.13 INFB 
(3.66) (-1.69) 
+ 0.32 MEP - 0.38 RBB 
(2.89) (-2.46) 
r2 = 0.525; F = 9.91; d.f. = 19 
indicate that the military burden MEP had a 
strong negative impact on growth in the non-
arms-producing group, and a statistically sig-
nificant and positive impact on growth in the 
producing countries. 4 
As to an explanation of the factors respon-
sible for these patterns, one can only specu-
late at this point. Perhaps in part the answer 
lies in the fact that, although far from verti-
cally integrated through all phases of wea-
pons production (Ayres, 1983), ceteris pari-
bus the producing countries should be 
somewhat less dependent on imports of arms 
to maintain a given level of military expendi-
tures. The lower import content per dollar of 
military expenditures should provide the 
arms producers with a stronger military 
expenditure income multiplier, and hence a 
more favorable impact on growth. OI1e 
implication of these results is that govern-
ments in countries producing arms may not 
be as constrained as their counterparts in the 
non-arms-producing countries in increasing 
allocations to defense. Finally, the overall 
positive impact of the defense burden on 
growth suggests that given a desired level of 
security, it may be possible for the producing 
countries to divert orders from imported to 
domestically-produced arms to offset the 
deflationary impact of increased current 
account deficits (Looney & Frederiksen, 
1987c). 
The introduction to this paper posed the 
question as to why, if military expenditures 
do in fact retard growth, do developing coun-
tries increase such expenditures? Clearly, for 
the arms-producing countries the usual guns 
vs. butter dilemma may not be operative to 
nearly the extent it is in the non-producing 
countries. In any event, a logical case can be 
made based on the results above that the 
economic constraints on military expendi-
tures in the arms-producing countries are 
likely to be somewhat less severe than in the 
case of the non-producers . 
4. Review of the Economic Determinants' 
Literature 
Recent interest has focused on the role of 
economic factors in effecting the overall level 
of military expenditures. Treddenick (1985) 
tested for the impact of economic variables 
on the recent pattern of Canadian military 
expenditures. Specifically he wished to see 
whether expenditures in Canada might be 
determined by 'domestic economic impera-
tives . . . independent of any security con-
siderations' (p. 77). He concluded that 
'recent large increases in Canadian defense 
expenditures have been influenced more by 
economic than by security considerations' 
(p. 78), and that change in military budgets 
has been a policy instrument used by the 
Canadian government. 
Maizels & Nissanke (1986) conducted a 
cross-section study of 83 countries with aver-
age data from 1978-80. They hypothesized 
three potential determinants of military 
expenditures in any country - the political 
framework, military activity and economic 
linkages. However, the relative importance 
of each factor will be determined by national, 
regional or global conflicts or interactions in 
the individual country. For example, at the 
national level economic factors such as the 
level of economic development (urbaniza-
tion, inequalities in wealth and income, and 
opportunities for advancement), real income 
growth, the size of the budget, and the 
influence of the military-industrial complex 
are considered important determinants of 
military spending. At the global level, they 
considered the growth of foreign exchange, 
the influence of foreign capital and major aid 
donors to be important determinants of mili-
tary spending. After estimating regression 
equations for the entire sample and for three 
regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin America), 
they noted not only that complexity of 
factors, but that these factors would vary 
from country to country. They concluded 
that: 
Domestic factors, particularly the need perceived by 
ruling elites to repress international opposition 
groups, and external factors, including relations with 
the global power blocs and the availability of foreign 
exchanges to purchase arms from abroad, also 
appear to the major determinants of government 
decisions in regard to military expenditures (p. 
1137). 
Harris (1986) noted the little attention 
paid to the economic determinants of mili-
tary spending levels in developing countries. 
In a time series analysis to verify the earlier 
findings of Ames & Goff (1975), he exa-
mined the importance of endogenous econ-
omic variables on defense spending levels in 
five ASEAN countries - Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
The independent variables were GNP levels, 
government revenues, inflation rates and the 
balance of payments. Three dependent vari-
ables were examined: defense as a percent of 
(a) GNP and (b) central governments, and 
the levels of defense spending. In addition, 
Harris tested for the presence of some sort of 
lag structure by regressing the dependent 
variables against the previous years' value of 
the independent variables. He concluded 
that: 
... economic conditions, especially government cur-
rent revenue, appear to exert at least a moderate 
influence on annual changes in defense expenditure 
in ASEAN ... A nation's GNP sets a broad limit on 
its domestically-financed defense expenditure, and 
that defense expenditure in the previous year is a 
good indicator of its level in the next year (p. 41). 
Harris also noted that the balance of pay-
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ments was an indirect effect through govern-
ment revenues and that cutting defense 
expenditures might be relatively difficult 
given its high personnel component. 
In their time series examination of ten 
Latin American countries, Looney & Fre-
deriksen (1987a) found that 
... a large proportion of variability in defense expen-
ditures can be explained by economic variables: the 
overall constraint (GDP) and fiscal funding variables 
(primarily government expenditures, but in two 
cases government revenues) . . . the results (also) 
suggest that the regions' superpowers might have a 
somewhat different set of fiscal linkages than the 
smaller countries (p. 21). 
5. Implications for the Present Study 
The literature reviewed above has a number 
of implications for the present study: 
(1) In contrast to the non-economic 
approaches to military expenditures, the 
economic explanations explicitly take 
into account the budgetary constraints 
on ruling elites. 
(2) Implicit in the economic approach is the 
notion of an optimal stock of military 
assets (and hence security) in developing 
countries. This optimal stock is, in turn, 
largely a function of perceived or 
imagined threats to the ruling class. 
(3) The economic and non-economic 
approaches to military expenditures can 
be linked with the assumption that the 
optimal level of military expenditures is 
exogenous with the actual level of allo-
cations to defense undertaken to bridge 
the gap between existing levels of secur-
ity and those deemed optimal. 
(4) The speed of adjustment between actual 
and optimal levels of security which 
determines the annual level of military 
expenditures can, in turn, be taken as a 
function of the economic resources at the 
disposal of the elites and the economic 
constraints under which they must 
operate. 
(5) Elites will mobilize additional resources 
for their survival as the degree of threat 
increases, but the overall economic con-
ditions will delineate the boundaries 
within which this mobilization can take 
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place (Maizels & Nissanke, 1986; 
Whynes, 1979, ch. 2). 
6. Economic Determinants of Defense 
Expenditures . . 
The economic literature is suggestive of a 
number of variables that are likely to affect 
the overall level of defense expenditures in 
developing countries. . 
First, as noted above, the gross domestic 
product is a relevant factor since, in a general 
way, national income deli!lea~es the oyerall 
ability of a country to mamtam a particular 
volume of military expenditure (O'Leary & 
Coplin, 1975). 
Second, the balance of payments deficit is 
also relevant, since again in a general. way 
this variable delineates the volume of exter-
nal resources that may be used to finance 
imports. A related factor is the ~ize of the 
external public debt, some of which has un-
doubtedly gone to finan~ing_ pa~t military 
expenditures. At any pomt m time, addi-
tional debt can be used to finance increased 
arms imports. On the other hand, for some 
countries the outstanding debt may in reduc-
ing their credit worthiness serve as a con-
straint to further arms imports. 
Third, the military burden (defined a~ !11ili-
tary expenditures per capita or m1htary 
expenditures as a sha~e. of GDP) ~ay al~o 
influence the level of m1htary expenditures m 
the sense that richer countries ceteris paribus 
are also likely to devote a larger proportion 
of their budgets to defense. This is the so-
called Wagner's Law effect (Thorn, 1~67). 
Fourth, there is evidence that mmeral-
exporting countries have different p~tterns 
of military expenditures than do their non-
mineral counterparts (Looney, 1987c): 
Fifth as noted above, the possess10n or 
not of' an indigenous arms industry may 
influence the pattern of military ex~endi­
tures trade-offs with other budgetary items, 
' . and arms imports. 
Based on the empirical studies summar-
ized above, it is possible to formulate a 
number of hypotheses concerning the likely 
influence of economic environments and 
factors on the defense allocation process: 
( 1) Since the non-producers are in large 
part resource constrained countries 
(Looney & Frederiksen, 1986c), ar~s 
imports for this group of co~ntnes 
should be positively associated with the 
overall level of imports. Here, for 
example, an increased ability to finance 
imports stemming from incre~sed 
export earnings would tend t<? allev1~t.e 
the foreign exchange constraint, fac1h-
tating increased imports in all areas, 
including arms imports. 
(2) Similarly, arms imports of the non-pro-
ducers would be expected to increase 
with the balance of payments deficit -
the ability to run higher deficits could 
be used to import additional arms. 
(3) On the other hand, given the low bor-
rowing capacity of the non-producers 
(Looney, 1987a), public external debt 
could probably not be used to finance 
additional arms imports (hence we 
should expect a negative sign on this 
term). . 
( 4) Due to their relative shortage of foreign 
exchange, it is likely that non-pro-
ducers will be faced with more severe 
budgetary trade-offs than their pro-
ducer counterparts. Given the relati-
vely high foreign exchang_e comp?~ents 
in health programs, we might anticipate 
a negative relationship between allo-
cations to this activity and arms 
imports. Due to its much higher local 
currency content, however, this rela-
tionship does not appear to hold for 
total military expenditures (Looney, 
1988b, 1986b). 
(5) For the producer countries, we might 
expect that arms imports wou~~ be 
linked fairly closely to total m1htary 
expenditures. Given the need for 
imported parts and components to 
maintain production runs, any expan-
sion in overall military expenditures 
and arms production would translate 
itself into a fairly specific arms import 
requirement. . 
(6) Given the relative abundance of foreign 
exchange in the arms-producing coun-
tries, we would not anticipate any 
marked set of trade-offs between social 
and military expenditures. 
(7) For total military expenditures, we 
would expect that both producers and 
non-producers would want to maintain 
some sort of ratio of military expendi-
tures to overall resource availability, 
depicted for example by GNP. As 
noted above, however, we might expect 
that the non-producers would finance 
additional military expenditures with 
balance of payments deficits - since 
their export earnings and overall bor-
rowing capacity are limited. 
(8) Given their commitment to the produc-
tion of armaments, we would expect the 
producers to have a more stable pattern 
of military expenditures over time. 
Ceteris pa rib us, the necessity of main-
taining production runs during periods 
of low threat as well as times of 
increased tension should result in pro-
ducing countries having a relatively 
stable ratio of military expenditures to 
gross national product. Furthermore, 
given their relatively higher levels of 
government revenues (Looney, 1988a), 
producers would also have more flexi-
bility in expanding or contracting mili-
tary expenditures to maintain this ratio. 
(9) With respect to public external debt, we 
would expect it to be a function of GNP 
- the overall level of economic activity, 
reserves - the higher the level, the less 
need to borrow, exports - the higher 
the level the more credit-worthy the 
country and military expenditures 
(Looney, 1987a). 
(10) Presumably the arms producers have 
better foreign exchange positions, and 
hence the option of borrowing to 
finance military expenditures if necess-
ary. If the government feels that bor-
rowing is necessary to keep production 
runs going, they would be more likely 
to borrow for military related activities 
than the non-producers. 
(11) With regard to total imports, we would 
anticipate that the non-producers, not 
being able to produce weapons, would 
find it necessary to import most equip-
ment - we would therefore expect to 
find a fairly close relationship between 
imports and military expenditures. This 
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relationship should not be as strong for 
the producers who have the option to 
buy local equipment or imported 
equipment. 
(12) Military expenditures as a share of 
GNP are likely to be much more stable 
in the producing countries than in the 
non-producing countries - due to the 
reasons discussed above. Given the 
need to maintain production runs, the 
governments in producer countries are 
more likely to borrow externally, 
increase taxes and or run larger govern-
ment deficits to maintain overall levels 
of military expenditures (Looney & 
Frederiksen, 1987a). 
(13) The share of defense in the budget 
would again probably be more stable 
for the producers than for the non-pro-
ducers. The process of indigenous pro-
duction sets up a stream of required 
arms imports to maintain production 
runs. We would expect a fairly close 
relationship between arms imports and 
the share of the budget for defense in 
the producing countries. Given their 
relatively unconstrained situation, 
there should be no major trade-offs 
with social programs such as education. 
(14) The literature seems to suggest that 
mineral (including oil economies) may 
use their additional revenue for social 
programs - public works and the like 
after meeting some target level of 
defense expenditures. We would 
expect therefore that mineral5 econo-
mies, everything else being equal, 
would have lower shares of their budget 
allocated to defense (Looney, l 987b). 
(15) Following Weede (1986, pp. 299-300), 
the external threat component of mili-
tary expenditures is proxied by the mili-
tary participation ratio, the proportion 
of the population under arms. 6 
.(16) Given the fact that non-producers will 
be more dependent on weapons 
imports for their mobilization, (which 
presumably can be more easily met out 
of existing weapons stocks in the pro-
ducing countries), we would expect 
increased threat to have a much more 
significant effect on these countries. 
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The producers probably have inventor-
ies of weapons from past production 
that can be used in a crisis. 
expenditures, military expenditures as a 
share of GNP, and the share of defense 
expenditures in the government budget. 
7. Empirical Tests 
It is clear from the above discussion that 
military expenditures, arms imports, the 
share of defense in the government's budget, 
total imports, and external debt are all inter-
related. To capture these effects for the 
purpose of testing the sixteen hypotheses 
developed in the previous section, a small 
model was specified and estimated with a 
two-stage least s~uares regression tech-
nique. 7 The model has six equations, and is 
designed to examine all facets of military 
expenditures: arms imports, total military 
The two links with the macroeconomic 
environment, and ultimately having impacts 
on growth, are the level of imports, a leakage 
from the income stream and hence tending to 
reduce growth, and the level of public exter-
nal debt, shown to increase growth in non-
constrained countries (Looney & Frederik-
sen, 1986b). To determine the relative 
impact of internal (economic) and external 
(threat) forces in effecting military expendi-
tures, two sets of equations were estimated. 
The first with only economic variables, and a 
second with the proxy for external threat -
armed forces per 1000 population, 1980 
(AFP) included. 
8. Empirical Results ;J,: 
8.1 Omission of External Threat :n;~ 
Two Stage Least Squares Estimates (standardized regression coefficients) '''i! 
Public External Debt (PD B) '' ''.! 
(total country sample) 
(1) PDB = 0.90 GNP - 0.29 GIRB + 0.35 TE + 0.13 MEY 
(14.31) (-3.77) (4.29) (3.00) 
. r2 = 0.934; d.f. = 37 
(arms producers) 
(1') PDB = 0.94 GNP - 0.27 GIRB + 0.31 TE+ 0.20 MEY 
(11.50) (-3.06) (3.26) (3.02) 
r2 = 0.947; d.f. = 16 
(non-producers) 
(1") PDB = 0.63 GNP - 0.30 GIRB + 0.47 TE + O.Q7 MEY 
(3. 78) (-1. 76) (2.32) (0.57) 
r2 = 0.760; d.f. = 20 
Share of Defense Expenditures in Central Government Budget (GEDB) 
(total sample) 
(2) GEDB = 0. 70 AI + 0.12 GEEB - 0.22 Mineral 
(4.92) (0.86) (-1.55) 
r2 = 0.492; d.f. = 37 
(arms producers) 
(2') GEDB = 0.83 AI + 0.41 GEEB - 0.45 rVfineral 
(6.34) (2.90) (-3.33) 
r2 = 0.802; d.f. = 16 
(non-producers) 
(2") GEDB = 0.60 AI - 0.06 GEEB + 0.15 Mineral 
(2.93) (-0.31) (0.77) 
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Arms Imports (Al) 
(total sample) 
(3) AI= 1.05 ME - 0.19 CAB - 0.42 POB - 0.29 TI+ 0.04 SH 
(5.57) (-0.76) (-1.27) (-1.36) (0.22) 
r2 = 0.519; d.f. = 37 
(arms producers) 
(3') AI = 0.94 ME + 0.20 CAB + 0.01 POB - 0.17 TI + 0.04 SH 
(7.10) (0.99) (0.06) - <-.1.16) - (0.22) 
?- - 0.844, d.f. - 16 
(non-producers) 
(3") Al= 0.81 ME - 0.14 CAB - 0.37 POB + 0.90 TI - 0.87 SH 
(4.12) (-1.56) (-2.03) (3.33) (-3.38) 
r2 = 0.931; d.f. = 20 
Military Expenditures (ME) 
(total sample) 
(4) ME= 0.46 MEY+ 0.56 GNP - 0.13 BI 
(3.64) (4.61) (-1.03) 
r2 = 0.523; d.f. = 37 
(arms producers) 
(4') ME= 0.62 MEY+ 0.47 GNP - 0.02 BI 
(2. 78) (2.23) ( -1.12) 
r2 = 0.460; d.f. = 16 
(non-producers) 
(4") ME= 0.14 MEY+ 0.34 GNP - 0.36 BI 
(0.97) (2.26) (-3.16) 
r2 = 0.883; d.f. = 20 
Total Imports (Tl) 
(total sample) 
(5) TI = 0.80 TE + 0.26 ME - 0.23 POB - 0.34 CAB 
(10.48) (3. 76) ( -1.95) - ( -.3.60) -
r2 - 0.914, d.f. - 37 
(arms producers) 
(5') TI= 0.90TE + 0.17 ME - 0.37 POB - 0.51 CAB 
(6.53) (1.58) (-1.62) - (2 .. 72) -
r2 - 0.873, d.f. - 16 
(non-producers) 
(5") TI= 0.47 TE+ 0.50 ME+ 0.12 POB - 0.02 CAB 
(6.38) (6.54) (1.47) (-0.23) 
r2 = 0.958; d.f. = 20 
Military Burden (Military Expenditures/Gross National Product (MEY)) 
(total sample) 
(6) MEY= 0.02 POPB + 0.80 GEOB - 0.20 GOB + 0.23 RTCRYB 
(0.16) (7 .52) ( -1. 76) (2.32) 
r2 = 0.723; d.f. = 37 
(arms producers) 
(6') MEY= 0.13 POPB + 0.56 GEOB - 0.15 GOB+ 0.41 RTCRYB 
(1.36) (7.74) (-1.84) (5.46) 
r2 = 0.955; d.f. = 16 
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(non-producers) 
(6") MEY = -0.01 PDPB + O.Ql GEDB - O.Ql GDB + O.Ql RTCRYB 
(-0.21) (5.17) (-1.04) (1.45) 
? = 0.661; d.f. = 20 
8.2 With External Threat 
Share of Defense Expenditures in Central Government Budget 
(total sample) 
(7) GEDB = 0.33 AI 
(2.31) 
(producers) 
(7') GEDB = 0.68 AI 
(4.32) 
(non-producers) 
+ 0.07 GEEB - 0.11 Mineral + 0.56 AFP 
(0.65) (-0.91) (4.19) 
? = 0.627; d.f. = 37 
+ 0.32 GEEB - 0.38 Mineral + 0.23 AFP 
(2.22) (-2.83) (1.55) 
? = 0.835; d.f. = 16 
(7") GEDB = -0.Ql Al + 0.15 GEEB + 0.16 Mineral + 0.86 AFP 
(-0.05) (0.95) (1.07) (3.69) 
? = 0.722; d.f. = 20 
Military expenditures 
(total sample) 
(8) ME = 0.16 MEY 
(0.63) 
+ 0.55 GNP - 0.07 BI + 0.36 AFP 
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(producers) 
(8') ME = 1.33 MEY 
(2.10) 
(non-producers) 
+ 0.43 GNP - 0.13 BI - 0.79 AFP 
(2.06) (-:=_0.58) . <-l.12) 
? - 0.518, d.f. - 16 
(8") ME= -0.19 MEY+ 0.30 GNP - 0.51 BI+ 0.45 AFP 
(1.23) (2.41) (-:=_3.26) . (337) 
? - 0.933, d.f. - 20 
Arms imports 
(total sample) 
(9) AI= 0.71 ME - 0.10 CAB - 0.14 PDB - 0.38 TI+ 0.07 SH+ 0.47 AFP 
(3.93) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-2.19) (0.48) (3.55) 
? = 0.678; d.f. = 37 
(producers) 
(9') AI = 0.80 ME + 0.23 CAB + 0.15 PDB - 0.27 TI + 0.07 SH + 0.32 AFP 
(7.43) (1.34) (0.60) ( -2.22) (0.51) (3.05) 
? = 0.919; d.f. = 16 
(non-producers) 
(9") AI= 0.35 ME - 0.11 CAB - 0.16 PDB + 0.72 TI - 0.67 SH+ 0.44 AFP 
(1.80) (-1.64) (-1.05) • (3.46) (-3.38) (3.63) 
9. Implications of Results 
The results tend to confirm our assertions 
about the influence of economic factors and 
environments in Third World defense expen-
ditures (points 1-16, above). It appears that 
a high proportion of the various measures of 
resources allocated to the military can be 
accounted for by internal (economic) 
factors. On the other hand, non-producer 
environments are relatively more susceptible 
to external factors. Apparently, the posses-
sion of an indigenous arms industry places 
on-going demands to maintain relatively 
high (and stable) levels of defense expendi-
tures. The governments of non-producing 
countries may not face the same political 
pressures to maintain high levels of defense 
expenditures during periods of low external 
threat simply to maintain employment in 
defense plants. 
In terms of the implications for demilitari-
zation, it is apparent that the advanced coun-
tries might be able to significantly reduce 
Third World military expenditures through 
pursuing a much more strict control of the 
licensing of arms production technology, and 
in the restriction of financial credits to build 
additional plants. 
In addition, the producing countries 
appear to finance a large part of their military 
expenditures with external debt (equations 
l', l"), and therefore are not necessarily 
shifting domestic resources away from pro-
ductive activities to produce arms. Tighter 
controls over foreign lending to these coun-
tries would undoubtedly make arms produc-
tion somewhat less attractive. 
In sum, it is the contention of this paper 
that analysis of Third World military expen-
ditures that emphasizes arms race dynamics 
and/or threat factors has tended to ignore 
the national and international economic fac-
tors that influence a nation's choice to buy, 
sell or produce arms. Lacking an inclusion 
of the economic incentives that are moti-
vating in most countries, these models often 
predict that countries scale down defense 
expenditures during periods of relatively low 
external tensions. The major build-up of 
defense expenditures in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s in many peaceful areas of the 
world clearly calls this framework into 
question. 
On the other hand, models of military 
expenditure of the type developed above are 
clearly not substitutes for many of the more 
traditional approaches. Instead the inclusion 
of a systematic framework of economic con-
straints should complement this research 
already done on arms transfers, and provide 
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an additional tool for assessing policies to 
regulate that market. 
NOTES 
1. This period was chosen largely due to the fact 
that it comes before the Third World debt crisis 
(1982), but after the second OPEC oil price 
increase (1978/79) had had some time to work 
itself out. As such, this period probably repre-
sents the culmination of forces that were put in 
motion by the first oil price increases (1973/74) 
and the subsequent wave of commercial bank 
lending to the Third World. 
2. Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent 
measure--of the size of indigenous arms indus-
tries across countries. In order to integrate this 
important factor into the analysis that follows 
we followed Neuman's (1984) criteria of classi-
fying countries as producers if they were cap-
able of producing at least one major weapons 
system. For purposes of this study the arms 
producers consisted of: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thai-
land, and Venezuela. 
3. Economic data are from the World Bank 
(1983, 1984, 1985, 1986). Military expendi-
tures are from the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (1987). 
4. Since the resource balance is negative for net 
capital inflows, a negative coefficient for this 
term indicates that foreign resources have a 
positive impact on growth. The capital inflow 
term is therefore similar to the foreign aid 
variable originally used by Benoit. 
5. A mineral economy is defined as one with over 
40% of its merchandise exports in the form of 
minerals or oil (Looney & Knouse, 1987). In 
the regressions below (equations 7, 7' and 7"), 
MINERAL is a dummy with 0 for non-mineral 
and 1 for mineral economies. A negative sign 
on this term would indicate that our hypothesis 
is correct. 
6. While this variable is not ideal, it is hard to 
think of another index that would have univer-
sal validity in reflecting the manner in which 
Third World countries as a whole respond to 
threats. On the other hand, given the fact that 
the economic variables used in this study 
undoubtedly depict more accurately the under-
lying budgetary constraints facing govern-
ments, there will be an unavoidable bias, 
downgrading the importance of external 
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factors in effecting Third World military 
expenditures. 
7. The rationale for this procedure is given in 
Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1976). 
8. The variables are PDB, the level of public 
external debt, 1981; GNP, gross national pro-
duct, 1981; TE, total exports, 1981; MEY, the 
share of military expenditures in Gross Natio-
nal Product (1981, dependent variable, 1980, 
independent variable); GIRB, the level of 
international reserves held by the country, 
1981; GEDB, the share of defense in the 
central government budget, 1981; AI, arms 
imports, 1981; GEEB, the share of education 
in the central government budget, 1981; ME, 
total military expenditures, 1981; CAB, the 
current account balance, 1981; Bl, the trade 
balance, 1981; SH, health expenditures, 1981; 
PD PB, ratio of external debt to Gross National 
Product, 1981; GDB, the government deficit 
share of Gross Domestic Product, 1981; 
RTCRYB, the ratio of government revenues 
to Gross National Product, 1981; AFP, armed 
forces per 1000 population, 1980. 
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